Revue d’Economie Industrielle, trimestre 4, 2012
Résumé: Nous utilisons une méthode d’Analyse par Enveloppe de Données (DEA) ainsi qu’une méthode d’Analyse par Frontière Stochastique (SFA) pour mesurer l’efficacité relative de 177 services d’eau en France, en 2009. Ces services peuvent être gérés directement par les communes (régies) ou être délégués à des opérateurs privés. L’utilisation de ces deux outils de benchmarking nous permet de distinguer la part de l’inefficience relative des services provenant de l’inefficience managériale, du contexte opérationnel et des bruits statistiques. Nos résultats indiquent tout d’abord que les opérateurs privés opèrent dans des environnements plus difficiles. Après correction de cet environnement d’exploitation, les services d’eau délégués demeurent, en moyenne, légèrement moins efficients en comparaison des régies. Cependant, cette faible différence se dissipe lorsque les performances relatives sont mesurées économétriquement.
Abstract :
The new European legislative proposals on public procurement suggest introducing the unconditional possibility for public buyers to use negotiated procedures with publication. Such procedures have been available to French public buyers for contracts up to €5 million since 2004. We use an original and comprehensive database from Paris Habitat-OPH, the largest social housing constructor in Europe, to empirically assess the impact of negotiated procedures on price. After satisfyingly dealing with the endogeneity issue associated with the use of negotiated procedures, we find that such procedures significantly decreased the received bids by close to 26 % (the coefficient drops to 15.7% when excluding « abnormally » high offers). Some drivers of the positive effects we observe are highlighted, enabling us to derive practical implications of these results for public policies.
Brazilian Administration Review, January-March, Volume 10, Number 1, p.100-120, (2013)
Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the private participation in prison services in three countries: Brazil, France, and the United States. We highlight striking differences in efficiency between these countries and argue that the explanation for these differences is not restricted to the way property rights are distributed (i.e. public vs. private management). Instead, our analysis suggests that understanding those differences also requires an analysis of the incentives provided by contractual choices as well as decision and revenue rights distribution and institutional constraints. The theoretical literature usually analyzes these blocks separately, and often focuses on property rights distribution. We argue that an efficient arrangement is the result of the way these elements are combined, giving rise to a distinctive governance structure.
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The Applied Law and Economics of Public Procurement
Edited by Gustavo Piga, Steen Treumer
Published 6th September 2012 by Routledge – 308 pages
This book explores Public Procurement novelties and challenges in an interdisciplinary way. The process whereby the public sector awards contracts to companies for the supply of works, goods or services is a powerful instrument to ensure the achievement of new public goals as well as an efficient use of public funds. This book brings together the papers that have been presented during the « First Symposium on Public Procurement », a conference held in Rome last summer and to be repeated again yearly.
As Public Procurement touches on many fields (law, economics, political science, engineering) the editors have used an interdisciplinary approach to discuss four main topics of interest which represent the four different parts in which this book is divided:
- Competitive dialogue and contractual design fostering innovation and need analysis,
- Separation of selection and award criteria, including exclusion of reputation indicators like references to experience, performance and CV’s from award criteria,
- Retendering a contract for breach of procurement rules or changes to contract (contract execution),
- Set-asides for small and medium firms, as in the USA system with the Small Business Act that reserves shares of tenders to SMEs only.
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L’article de Julie de Brux et Claudine Desrieux intitulé « To allot or not to allot public services? An incomplete contract approach » vient d’être publié dans le dernier numéro de la revue European Journal of Law and Economics.
Transposition de la « Directive défense » : Abistis, dulces caricæ?
La garantie de la souveraineté de l’Etat implique l’indépendance nationale. En 1958, le Constituant a confié la garantie de l’indépendance nationale au Président de la République[2], comme pour mieux souligner les liens étroits qui unissent l’indépendance nationale et la souveraineté de l’Etat. La République française ne saurait être obligée par une quelconque norme qui lui serait exogène[3] ou commandée par un Etat tiers et il est de la responsabilité du chef de l’Etat d’y veiller.
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Journal of Transport, Economics and Policy, 2013, Volume 47, Number 1, p.17-34, (2013)
In this paper we investigate the relationship between cost and number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database on 806 calls for tender on local bus transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of service. This finding, in addition of being one of the few empirical tests of a crucial theoretical issue, has important policy implications, especially for countries in which bids are organized such that only few bidders are allowed to participate (e.g. France). More precisely, our results point out that the allotment of an urban transport network may be a source of significant costs reductions.
Industrial and Corporate Change, 2012, Vol 21 (4), 811-836
In this article, we use a large database of more than 3700 interfirm relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner’s reputation. Our results also suggest that while formal contracts have a direct negative impact on ex-post cooperation, they are an enhancing factor of cooperative behaviors as soon as the intrinsic hazards of the relationship require higher ex-ante contractual safeguards to secure agreements.
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Guillaume Fonouni-Farde,La délégation du service public de la sécurité : Asinus equum spectat?, 2011, Revue Administrative. Abstract: Officiellement lancée au début de la XIIIème législature, la Révision Générale des Politiques Publiques…
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Julie de Brux, Claudine Desrieux, Vincent Piron, 2011, Transports, n°465, janvier-février 2011 Abstract: Plus que jamais, la contrainte budgétaire est forte dans les pays de l’OCDE, et les décideurs se focalisent…
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