Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts
IAE de Paris – 12 rue Jean-Antoine de Baïf – Salle D5 – 12h-13h30
Jean Beuve, Marian Moszoro and Stéphane Saussier
Abstract. We compare procurement contracts where the procurer is either a public agent or a private corporation. Using algorithmic data reading and textual analysis on a rich dataset of contracts for a standardized product and service from a single provider, we find that public contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and their renegotiation is formalized more frequently in amendments.
Short bio. Prof. Moszoro is currently a visiting scholar at Harvard Law School and a faculty affiliate at Cornell University’s Program in Infrastructure Policy. Marian Moszoro earned his PhD in Economics from the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH). His research encompasses three areas: (a) project finance and public-private hybrids, (b) public contracts, scrutiny, and political contestability, and (c) governance, risk perception, and asset pricing. He has published four books, several book chapters and journal articles, and more than 15 business case studies. More about Marian Moszoro on his personal website : http://www.moszoro.net.