Posts de Stéphane Saussier
(Potential) Number of Bidders and Winning Bids Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model
Journal of Transport, Economics and Policy, 2013, Volume 47, Number 1, p.17-34, (2013)
In this paper we investigate the relationship between cost and number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database on 806 calls for tender on local bus transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of service. This finding, in addition of being one of the few empirical tests of a crucial theoretical issue, has important policy implications, especially for countries in which bids are organized such that only few bidders are allowed to participate (e.g. France). More precisely, our results point out that the allotment of an urban transport network may be a source of significant costs reductions.
Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract
Industrial and Corporate Change, 2012, Vol 21 (4), 811-836
In this article, we use a large database of more than 3700 interfirm relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner’s reputation. Our results also suggest that while formal contracts have a direct negative impact on ex-post cooperation, they are an enhancing factor of cooperative behaviors as soon as the intrinsic hazards of the relationship require higher ex-ante contractual safeguards to secure agreements.
Lire la suiteGestion publique ou privée ? Un benchmarking des services d’eau en France
Numéro: 2012-1 Gestion publique ou privée ? Un benchmarking des services d’eau en France Par Aude Le Lannier et Simon Porcher Abstract: Nous utilisons une méthode d’Analyse par Enveloppe de Données (DEA) ainsi qu’une méthode d’Analyse par Frontière Stochastique (SFA) pour mesurer l’efficacité relative de 177 services d’eau en France, en 2009. Ces services peuvent être gérés…
Lire la suiteJulie DE BRUX
Renegotiation and performance in public-private contractual arrangements. An economic analysis Novembre 2011
Lire la suiteJean BEUVE
Reputation, Informal Dealings and Contractual Dynamics. Four Essays on Contract Economics Novembre 2011
Lire la suiteTo allot or not to allot public services in Europe? An incomplete contract approach
Numéro: 2011-7 To allot or not to allot public services in Europe? An incomplete contract approach Julie De Brux and Claudine Desrieux Abstract: Using an incomplete contract framework, we analyze the consequences of allotment in public procurement, which has been introduced by the European Directive 2004/18/EC. We evaluate the impacts both on price and quality of public…
Lire la suite« La délégation du service public de la sécurité : Asinus equum spectat1 ? »
Guillaume Fonouni-Farde,La délégation du service public de la sécurité : Asinus equum spectat?, 2011, Revue Administrative. Abstract: Officiellement lancée au début de la XIIIème législature, la Révision Générale des Politiques Publiques (RGPP) participe d’une entreprise plus large de refinancement du budget de l’Etat, dont la baisse des dépenses publiques et l’amélioration de la performance des politiques…
Lire la suiteReputation and the Dynamics of Contractual Incompleteness.
Numéro: 2011-6 Reputation and the Dynamics of Contractual Incompleteness. Claudine Desrieux and Jean Beuve Abstract: This article examines why in some cases parties are willing to sign agreements that are left intentionally incomplete with regard to future contingencies, and why they prefer to choose more complete agreements in some other situations. More complete contracts allow avoiding ex-post…
Lire la suiteRelational Contract and Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness. Experimental Evidence.
Numéro: 2011-5 Relational Contract and Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness. Experimental Evidence. Jean Beuve and Claudine Desrieux Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the interaction between relational contracting and endogenous contractual incompleteness. To account for contractual relationships with perspective of future interactions, we design an infinitely repeated games experiment between identifiable players. In this experiment, the probability of continuation and…
Lire la suiteRenegotiations, Discretion and Contract Renewals, An Empirical Analysis of Public-Private Agreements
Numéro: 2011-4 Renegotiations, Discretion and Contract Renewals, An Empirical Analysis of Public-Private Agreements Jean Beuve, Julie De Brux et Stéphane Saussier Abstract:This paper studies how renegotiations influence ongoing contractual relationships. By using an original dataset of 252 expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we explore the link between renegotiations and subsequent contract renewals.…
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