The new European legislative proposals on public procurement suggest introducing the unconditional possibility for public buyers to use negotiated procedures with publication. Such procedures have been available to French public buyers for contracts up to €5 million since 2004. We use an original and comprehensive database from Paris Habitat-OPH, the largest social housing constructor in Europe, to empirically assess the impact of negotiated procedures on price. After satisfyingly dealing with the endogeneity issue associated with the use of negotiated procedures, we find that such procedures significantly decreased the received bids by close to 26 % (the coefficient drops to 15.7% when excluding « abnormally » high offers). Some drivers of the positive effects we observe are highlighted, enabling us to derive practical implications of these results for public policies.
Brazilian Administration Review, January-March, Volume 10, Number 1, p.100-120, (2013)
Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the private participation in prison services in three countries: Brazil, France, and the United States. We highlight striking differences in efficiency between these countries and argue that the explanation for these differences is not restricted to the way property rights are distributed (i.e. public vs. private management). Instead, our analysis suggests that understanding those differences also requires an analysis of the incentives provided by contractual choices as well as decision and revenue rights distribution and institutional constraints. The theoretical literature usually analyzes these blocks separately, and often focuses on property rights distribution. We argue that an efficient arrangement is the result of the way these elements are combined, giving rise to a distinctive governance structure.Lire la suite