



Public-Private Partnerships and Investment in Infrastructure

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
“Contracts, Procurement and Public-Private Agreements”, Paris

30-31 May 2011


Context

- Background
 - Project on infrastructure investment
- Questionnaire on infrastructure investment
- Assessing policy settings
 - Composite indicator

The rise of project finance




Country experience




Number of project finance deals
Dealogic projectware

Sectoral shares



Fiscal consolidation




Questionnaire

- Ad hoc questionnaire – December 2007
 - What was the state of play then
 - Mainly binary responses
- Network industries
 - Regulation (regulator, pricing policies)
 - Concessions and franchises
 - Infrastructure planning and financing

Questionnaire II


- 38 sets of questions (~1400 responses)
 - 25/30 responded
 - Regulators/pricing - 83% response rate
 - Concessions/franchises - 75% (some questions only 50%)
 - Planning and financing – 60% (less for PPPs, though some claimed no experience)
 - Hope to put questionnaire and responses on web

Example: franchises




Outcome at the end of a franchise


■ roll-over or negotiated with the incumbent ■ transferred to the public sector ■ re-contracted



Quality standards



Assessing policy for PPPs



Decision-making framework

- Ensure PPPs are the appropriate investment structure
- Consult with independent bodies (ex ante and ex post)
- Account for the full fiscal implications

Minimising costs


- Minimising transaction costs
 - Setting size limits
 - Bundling projects
- Obtain necessary licences and permissions in advance

Ensuring value for money

- Output rather than input specifications
- Take into account risks (e.g. limits on debt, revenue sharing clauses or minimum revenues)
- Contract re-negotiation and arbitration mechanisms
- Set mechanism for determining residual value of assets


Country policy frameworks

Indicator of efficiency constraining features of PPP frameworks
(90% confidence intervals)



Indicator and sub-components

Scale 0-6 from most to least preferred policies



Cross-product dummies

	CZE	AUT	IRL	PRT	BEL	CAN	KOR	MEX	DEU	FRA	ITA	HUN	AUS	USA	JPN	ESP	NOR	TUR	SVK
CZE	.	(+)*	.	.	(+)**	.	.	.	(+)***	.	.	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***	(+)***
AUT	(-)*	(+)**	(+)**	(+)**	(+)**
IRL	(+)*	.	.	.	(+)*	.	(+)**	(+)**	.	(+)***	
PRT	(+)**	.	.	(+)**	(+)**	(+)*	(+)***	(+)***	(+)**	(+)***	
BEL	(-)**	(+)*	(+)*	(+)**	.	(+)**	
CAN	(+)*	(+)**	.	(+)**	
KOR	(-)*	.	.	.	(+)**	.	.	(+)**	(+)*	(+)**	(+)**	(+)***	(+)***	(+)**	(+)***
MEX	(+)**	.	.	(+)**	(+)**	(+)*	(+)***	(+)***	(+)**	(+)***	(+)***
DEU	(-)***	.	(-)*	(-)**	.	(-)**	(-)**	.	.	(+)*	(+)*
FRA	(-)*	(+)*	.	(+)**	(+)**	.	(+)**
ITA	(-)*	(+)**	(+)***	.	(+)***
HUN	(-)***	.	.	(-)**	.	.	(-)**	(-)**
AUS	(-)***	(-)*
USA	(-)***	.	(-)*	(-)**	.	.	(-)***	(-)**	.	.	(-)*	(-)*
JPN	(-)***	.	.	.	(-)*	.	(-)**	(-)*
ESP	(-)***	.	(-)**	(-)***	.	(-)*	(-)***	(-)***	.	(-)**	(-)**
NOR	(-)***	(-)**	(-)**	(-)***	.	(-)**	(-)***	(-)***	(-)***	.	(-)**	(-)**	(-)**
TUR	(-)***	.	.	(-)**	.	.	(-)**	(-)**
SVK	(-)***	(-)**	(-)**	(-)***	.	(-)**	(-)***	(-)***	(-)***	.	(-)**	(-)**	(-)**

Note: Stars denote the level of significance: *: 90%, **: 95%, ***: 99%.



Thank you

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